The harm principle
The only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over anyone is to prevent harm to others. His own good is not a sufficient warrant.
The Nineteenth Century · 1806 – 1873
约翰·斯图亚特·密尔
The classic statement of liberalism: coercion of an individual is justified only to prevent harm to others. He refined utilitarianism and cast the first parliamentary vote for women's rights.
It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.
Source: Utilitarianism, ch. 2
Mill was the eldest son of James Mill, Bentham's closest ally, and was raised by his father as the heir of utilitarianism: Greek at three, Latin at eight, logic and political economy at twelve, with no playmates and no childhood. He later said he had started with an advantage of a quarter of a century over his contemporaries. At seventeen he joined the East India Company, where he worked for thirty-five years while founding the Utilitarian Society and editing Bentham's manuscripts.
In 1826, at twenty, he fell into depression. He asked himself whether he would be happy if every reform he worked for were achieved; the answer was no. He recovered his feelings through Wordsworth's poetry and thereafter joined Bentham's system to Romanticism, Coleridge and Goethe. In 1830 he met Harriet Taylor, a married intellectual; they kept a platonic relationship for twenty-one years and married in 1851 after her husband's death. He said his best work was written with her.
A System of Logic (1843) built an inductive logic for empiricism, holding that even mathematics comes from experience, and extended inductive method to the social sciences. The Principles of Political Economy became the standard textbook and leaned further toward socialism with each edition. After Harriet's death in 1859 he published On Liberty, arguing that freedom of thought, speech and ways of living is the condition of social progress, that the opinion of the majority can be a tyranny, and that only the prevention of harm to others can justify limiting an individual's liberty.
Utilitarianism accepted Bentham's principle but distinguished the quality of pleasures and stressed conscience and the sense of justice. Elected to Parliament in 1865 he moved an amendment for women's suffrage and defended Irish tenants and Jamaican blacks; in 1869 The Subjection of Women called the subordination of one sex the last barrier to human progress. He spent his last years beside Harriet's grave at Avignon writing his Autobiography and was buried next to her. Russell, Rawls and the whole liberal tradition descend from him.
The only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over anyone is to prevent harm to others. His own good is not a sufficient warrant.
Silencing an opinion robs the whole human race: if it is right we lose the chance to correct error, if wrong we lose the clearer perception of truth from its collision.
Pleasures differ in quality, not only quantity. Better a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.
Democracy does not end oppression; social opinion crushes individuality more pervasively than law. Liberty needs to protect minorities and eccentrics.
What is called women's nature is an artificial product. The subordination of half the human race contradicts every principle of modern society.
Raised by Bentham as his successor, after a breakdown at twenty he revised his master: pleasures differ in quality, and it is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied.
From Comte he took the positive method for the social sciences while rejecting the Religion of Humanity and its contempt for liberty.
The Subjection of Women carried her argument into Parliament: he was the first MP to propose votes for women.
Mill wanted to apply inductive logic to the 'moral sciences'; Dilthey thought the road was wrong: understanding people and explaining nature are two different kinds of knowing.
Pragmatism is dedicated to Mill: 'whom my fancy likes to picture as our leader were he alive today'.
The Foundations of Arithmetic devotes a section to mocking Mill's empiricism about mathematics: if 2+3=5 came from observing pebbles, arithmetic textbooks would be geological reports.
Mill was his godfather; he inherited Mill's liberalism and empiricism but replaced Mill's inductive logic with modern logic.
Principia Ethica takes Mill as its cautionary example: to infer 'desirable' from 'desired' is the specimen of the naturalistic fallacy.
She lumped English moral philosophy from Mill to Hare together as 'consequentialism', a word she coined, to charge it with permitting anything for the sake of good results.
Utilitarianism was his chief adversary: it lets the happiness of the many sacrifice the few, whereas justice denies that the loss of freedom for some can be made right by a greater good shared by others.
He revived Mill's view that proper names have denotation but no connotation: 'Socrates' means no description, it simply denotes Socrates.
He remade utilitarianism from a doctrine about happiness into a doctrine about reasons, and pushed its population ethics to the 'repugnant conclusion'.
His utilitarianism descends directly from Mill and Sidgwick, but he applies it to practice far more relentlessly than they did: poverty, animals, euthanasia, effective altruism.