Causation as custom
We observe no necessary connection, only constant conjunction. Belief that the sun will rise tomorrow is custom, not reason.
The Early Modern Age · 1711 – 1776
休谟
Took empiricism to its limit: causation is habit, the self a bundle of perceptions, reason the slave of the passions. Kant said he woke him from his dogmatic slumber.
Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions.
Source: A Treatise of Human Nature 2.3.3
Hume was born into a family of minor Scottish gentry and entered Edinburgh University at twelve. His family meant him for the law, but he found 'an insurmountable aversion to everything but the pursuits of philosophy and general learning'. At eighteen he discovered 'a new scene of thought' and overworked himself into a nervous collapse. In 1734 he went to France and lived three years near La Flèche, where Descartes had studied, writing the Treatise of Human Nature. Published in 1739, it 'fell dead-born from the press', as he put it.
He twice applied for chairs at Edinburgh and Glasgow and was twice rejected as an atheist. He tutored a mad marquess, served as a general's secretary, and recast the Treatise as the more accessible Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. In the 1750s he wrote a six-volume History of England, became a best-seller and grew rich on royalties. In 1763 he went to Paris as embassy secretary, was lionised by the salons, brought Rousseau to England, and was then driven to distraction by Rousseau's paranoia.
His philosophy starts from one principle: every idea derives from an impression. We never observe a necessary connection between cause and effect, only constant conjunction; 'necessity' is the expectation that habit produces in the mind. Induction cannot be justified by reason. When I look inward I find no 'self', only perception after perception. Reason can tell us only means; ends are set by passion, and moral judgements come from sentiment, not reason. He faced death with composure; Boswell visited expressly to learn whether an atheist was afraid, and Hume replied that he feared it no more than his non-existence before birth. The Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, published posthumously, remain the most powerful critique of the argument from design.
We observe no necessary connection, only constant conjunction. Belief that the sun will rise tomorrow is custom, not reason.
Inferring the future from the past presupposes the uniformity of nature, which can itself be justified only by induction. The circle cannot be broken.
Introspection finds no persisting self, only a succession of perceptions. Personal identity is a fiction of the imagination.
Reason judges only truth and falsity and cannot move to action. Morality rests on sympathy and sentiment, and there is a gap between is and ought.
Testimony is never as reliable as the evidence for laws of nature, so no testimony can establish a miracle.
Reading Hume on utility as the ground of morals, he said 'the scales fell from my eyes'.
Hume's doubt about causation made him abandon 'why': science answers only 'how', describing regularities among phenomena.
He accepted Hume's conclusion that induction cannot be justified but rejected his psychological account: science never relied on induction, it works by conjecture and refutation.
'Actions, Reasons, and Causes' opposed the Wittgensteinian consensus and reasserted that reasons are causes, that Humean causal explanation applies to action.
She cited Hume's 'no ought from is' but turned it round: without a divine lawgiver the moral 'ought' has lost its sense, and utilitarians and Kantians alike are using an empty word.
His first book was on Hume: the subject is not given but constituted within the flow of experience, an empiricism that runs through all his thought.
His theory of personal identity is the contemporary version of Hume's 'bundle': no deep self, only psychological continuity, which can come in degrees and can branch.