The question of Being
Philosophy has always studied beings while forgetting Being itself. Being is not a thing but the event by which anything appears at all.
The Twentieth Century to Today · 1889 – 1976
海德格尔
He raised anew the question of the meaning of Being: the human being is Dasein, thrown into the world, caring, being-toward-death; later he turned to language, technology and the history of Being. His entanglement with Nazism remains contested.
Language is the house of Being.
Source: Letter on Humanism (1947)
Heidegger was the son of the sexton of the Catholic church in Messkirch, a small town on the edge of the Black Forest. Church scholarships took him through school and university; he intended the priesthood, gave it up for reasons of health, turned to philosophy, took his doctorate in 1913 and his teaching qualification in 1915 with a thesis on Duns Scotus. In the war he served in a meteorological unit. In 1919 he broke with Catholicism, became Husserl's assistant and lectured at Freiburg, where students said his classes cast a spell like a magician's.
In 1923 he became professor at Marburg; his students included Gadamer, Löwith, Arendt (with whom he had a secret affair) and future theologians. Being and Time appeared in 1927, only the first half of the planned work, and changed German philosophy at once. Western philosophy since Plato, it argues, has forgotten Being itself and studied only beings; to raise the question again one must first analyse the being that can ask it, the human being, which he calls Dasein. The being of Dasein is care; its structure is being-in-the-world; it is thrown into a world already meaningful, falls into the idle talk of 'the they', and can exist authentically only in anxiety and in facing its own death. Temporality is the meaning of Dasein's being.
In 1928 he succeeded Husserl at Freiburg. In April 1933 he became rector of the university and in May joined the Nazi party; his inaugural address summoned the university to serve the nation's 'historical mission'. He resigned after a year but kept his party membership until 1945. After the war the French occupation authorities banned him from teaching for five years. He never publicly apologised; a Spiegel interview of 1966, published after his death, offers more excuse than reflection. The Black Notebooks, published from 2014, show antisemitic content in his thinking of the 1930s. The relation between his philosophy and his politics is still argued over.
From the 1930s his thought underwent a 'turn': no longer starting from Dasein but from the history of Being itself, which reveals and conceals itself differently in each epoch; metaphysics is the history of the forgetting of Being, and Nietzsche its end. He turned to Hölderlin's poetry, the Presocratic fragments, language ('the house of Being') and technology, which turns everything into 'standing-reserve' available for control, the supreme danger. He wrote in a hut in the Black Forest and said late in life that 'only a god can save us'. His influence reaches Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer, Levinas, Derrida and Foucault, and extends into theology, architecture and ecological thought.
Philosophy has always studied beings while forgetting Being itself. Being is not a thing but the event by which anything appears at all.
The human being is not a subject facing a world but is from the start in the world, entangled with tools, others and meanings. Descartes' subject–object split is derivative.
Death is Dasein's ownmost possibility, which no one can take over. Facing it calls one back from the averageness of 'the they' to oneself.
We are thrown without choice into a situation and yet always project ourselves toward possibilities. Freedom is projection within thrownness.
The essence of technology is not machinery but a mode of revealing that turns nature, and humanity too, into calculable, controllable reserve. The danger is that this mode becomes the only one.
It is not we who speak language but language that speaks. Poets and thinkers are the guardians of the language in which Being comes to appear.
He was Husserl's assistant and designated heir; Being and Time is dedicated to him, yet it turned phenomenology from the analysis of consciousness into the analysis of Dasein, and the two grew apart.
His early Aristotle lectures electrified students; he read out of the Physics and the Nicomachean Ethics a pre-theoretical, practical understanding of being.
Anxiety, authenticity and being-toward-death come from Kierkegaard, stripped of Christian content and recast as existential structures.
From 1936 to 1940 he lectured on Nietzsche for four years, reading him as the completer of metaphysics and as his own antagonist.
He sought the forgotten experience of Being among the Presocratics; Parmenides' 'thinking and being are the same' was a sentence he interpreted again and again.
From 1928 to 1932 he was Heidegger's student, hoping to join Marx with Being and Time; Heidegger's choice in 1933 he regarded ever after as betrayal.
He met Heidegger at Freiburg in 1923 and said that from then on he 'knew what thinking was'. Truth and Method turned Heidegger's ontology of understanding into a hermeneutics of tradition, dialogue and application.
Being and Nothingness took its subtitle, 'a phenomenological ontology', and many concepts from Being and Time, yet Heidegger disowned existentialism in the Letter on Humanism.
At eighteen his student and secret lover at Marburg, she learned from him to treat philosophy as the activity of thinking, then turned his contemplation toward action and the public realm, and wrestled all her life with his political failure.
He called Heidegger one of the greatest philosophers since Plato and said he had spent his life 'leaving the climate of Heidegger': ontology reduces the Other to the understanding of Being, and ethics must come before ontology.
'Deconstruction' translates and reworks Heidegger's 'Destruktion': dismantling the history of metaphysics, but no longer in order to return to some more originary Being.